Introduction by Weber, Erik et al.
Philosophica 86 (2012) pp. 5-9 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Erik Weber, Dietlinde Wouters & Joke Meheus 
According to the members of the Vienna Circle, there was a strong 
connection between logic, reasoning, and rationality. They believed that 
human reasoning (and in particular scientific reasoning) is rational in so 
far as it is based on logic (which meant for them classical logic). It was 
also believed that scientific reasoning (for them the hallmark of human 
reasoning) was in general rational. In the second half of the twentieth 
century, both beliefs came under attack. 
One of the motors for this change was the turn in history of science 
initiated by Alexandre Koyré. In the „old history of science‟ success 
stories were told, usually on the basis of published papers and even 
textbooks, and only theories that had survived were considered (Galileo‟s 
law of free fall, Kepler‟s three laws, Newton‟s gravitation theory, and so 
on). Moreover, no attention was paid to mistaken paths, nor to the 
contexts in which the original theories were formulated and accepted. So, 
what happened was that nice and polished reconstructions of scientific 
episodes were made, with classical logic as the underlying logic, and that 
the results were deemed to be rational. In the „new history of science‟, 
things changed radically. Theories were studied in their historical setting, 
and explicit attention was directed not only to theories that were 
abandoned (such as the phlogiston theory), but also to ﬂaws, and to 
elements that played a crucial role in the construction of new theories, but 
that are today considered as non-rational. Examples are Kepler‟s work on 
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astrology and on the harmony of the spheres, and Newton‟s work on 
alchemy. 
In the aftermath of Koyré, philosophers of science, such as Hanson 
and Kuhn, also followed this new trend and started basing their 
philosophical analyses on actual examples from the history of science. 
Two central lessons came out of all this. First, the so-called „context of 
justification‟, which was the sole concern of the members of the Vienna 
Circle, is less straightforward and less „logical‟ than was traditionally 
accepted. Next, the „context of discovery‟ is much more structured and 
methodical than was believed within the Vienna Circle, even though it is 
not understandable from the point of view of classical logic. The 
conclusion was that logic is inadequate to explicate actual examples of 
human reasoning, whether in the sciences or in everyday life. 
There were several reactions to this situation. Some scholars held on 
to the link between (classical) logic and rationality, but concluded that 
scientific reasoning (especially as it occurs in the context of discovery) is 
inherently non-rational or even irrational. Others gave up the connection 
between logic and rationality. They looked for tools elsewhere (mainly in 
psychology and cognitive science) to analyse the rational character of 
scientific reasoning, often at the expense of rigour and formal accuracy. 
Times have changed, however. Today, a multiplicity of formal 
frameworks (ranging from non-classical logics over probability theory to 
Bayesian networks) is available in addition to classical logic. Also, 
historians and philosophers of science as well as psychologists have 
described a rich variety of patterns in both scientific and common sense 
reasoning. 
The aim of the congress Logic, Reasoning and Rationality (Centre for 
Logic and Philosophy of Science, Gent, 20-22 September 2010) was to 
stimulate the use of formal frameworks to explicate concrete examples of 
human reasoning, and conversely, to challenge scholars in formal studies 
by presenting them with interesting new examples of actual reasoning. 
This special issue contains a selection of  papers on rationality and 
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justified belief presented at the congress. Other papers presented at the 
congress are be published in a book (Logic, Reasoning and Rationality, 
Springer) and in special issues of the journals Foundations of Science, 
Logic & Logical Philosophy and Logique & Analyse. 
The first paper in this issue is The problem of Kuhnian rationality by 
Rogier De Langhe. According to Thomas Kuhn (1962/1970), science is 
characterized by two levels, one within and one between paradigms. The 
problem of Kuhnian rationality concerns the choice between paradigms, 
for which no rational basis appears to exist because this choice is 
inevitably circular to some extent. This is the main reason why Kuhn's 
view is perceived to glorify irrationality. Rogier De Langhe presents us 
two interpretations of the problem of Kuhnian rationality, one based on 
concepts (the neo-positivist interpretation) and one based on values. He 
also describes two notions of rationality, optimizing and satisficing. 
Neither interpretation supports the notion of optimizing, but the values-
interpretation supports satisficing, suggesting that if Kuhnian scientists 
are rational, as Kuhn insisted, they are satisficers. An agent-based model 
demonstrates that aggregating the behaviour of satisficing agents can 
account for Kuhn's view on the dynamics of scientific change. 
Adam Grobler is the author of the article Fifth part of the definition of 
knowledge. It is commonly accepted that knowledge is degettierized 
justified true belief. On the other hand, one can easily acquire 
degettierized justified true beliefs without any skill of applying them, 
whether in practice or in forming further justified beliefs. Such beliefs 
can hardly be called knowledge. He suggests, therefore, that information 
may count as knowledge only when it is structured so that it is applicable 
in the process of belief- or knowledge-formation. He attempts to 
reconstruct the required structure in terms of Wiśniewski‟s logic of 
questions and he suggests that in order for a belief to count as knowledge 
it is necessary to be able to place it in an erotetic argument. 
The rationality of scientific reasoning in the context of pursuit: 
drawing appropriate distinctions is a contribution by Dunja Šešelja, 
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Laszlo Kosolosky and Christian Straßer. In their paper they aim to 
disambiguate between different notions of pursuit worthiness regarding 
scientific inquiries. To this end they propose a unifying pattern of pursuit 
worthiness: “It is rational for Y to pursue X if and only if pursuing X is 
conducive of the set of goals Z.” By showing in which ways variables X, 
Y, and Z can be changed, they present different notions of pursuit and 
pursuit worthiness. With respect to variable X, they distinguish the 
pursuit of scientific theories, epistemic objects, and technological 
developments. With respect to variable Z, they distinguish between 
epistemic and practical pursuit worthiness. Finally, with respect to 
variable Y, they distinguish between individual and communal pursuit 
worthiness. By means of these distinctions the authors are able to 
explicate some of the major ambiguities underlying the concept of pursuit 
of pursuit worthiness, as well as to shed light on some confusions in 
philosophical literature that have resulted from their neglect.  
In Rationally evaluating inconsistent theories, Erik Weber and 
Maarten Van Dyck try to find out the answers of the following questions: 
What happens if one applies the “evaluation methodology” of Theo 
Kuipers to inconsistent theories? And what happens if one applies the 
“problem solving methodology” of Larry Laudan to inconsistent 
theories?  They argue that in both cases something unacceptable happens. 
First they show us that application of Kuipers‟ methodology to 
inconsistent theories leads to a methodological stalemate: inconsistent 
theories are incomparable to consistent ones. Then they show that 
according to Laudan‟s methodology inconsistent theories are always 
better than consistent ones. Finally, they offer partial solutions to these 
problems. 
The congress was organised in honour of Diderik Batens. It served as 
an opportunity for him – on the verge of his retirement – to look back on 
his long and distinguished academic career and clarify his personal views 
to the audience. Among other things, Batens helped shape paraconsistent 
logic and was the founder of adaptive logics. 
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